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SUKU SIMALUNGUN:
AN ETHNIC GROUP IN SEARCH OF REPRESENTATION* 
R. W. Liddle
Sin Raja sini Purba,
Sin Dolog sini Panei,
Naidja pe lang marubah,
Asal na marholong atei.
From Raja or from Purba,
From Dolog or from Pane,
Where one comes from doesn't matter, 
As long as he has compassion.
-- A Simalungun Batak proverb.
Introduction
Simalungun (pop. about 525,000) is one of eleven regen­
cies (or second-level self-governing regions) in the province 
of North Sumatra, and is located about two hours by car or 
bus south and west on a paved all-weather road from the pro­
vincial capital of Medan on the east coast. Approximately in 
the center of the regency is the municipality of Pematangsian- 
tar (also called P. Siantar or Siantar), a market and admin­
istrative center and the second largest city of North Sumatra, 
with a population of approximately 113,000. At the head of 
the regency government (which is separate from that of the 
municipality) is the Kepala Daerah (Regional Head, also called 
bupati or regent), who is appointed by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs from a list of nominees presented by the regency leg­
islature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah-Gotong Rojong or 
DPRD-GR, Mutual Help People's Regional Representative Council).* 1 
The Regional Head is responsible for general administration 
and coordination of the various central government bureaus
* Field research for this paper was carried out in 1963-64 
under a grant from the Ford Foundation's Foreign Area 
Training Fellowship Program. The author would like to 
thank Harry J. Benda for his critical comments. The sit­
uation described in the essay applies primarily to the 
1963-1964 period. No attempt has been made to suggest 
alterations occuring since that time.
1. For an analysis of the institutions of regional government, 
see Legge, John D., Central Authority and Regional Autonomy 
in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration 1950-1960,
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961.
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4located in the region. He also serves as chairman of the 
DPRD-GR, which is authorized to pass legislation concerning 
the "household affairs" of the regency, and of the Front 
Nasional (National Front), a representative body charged with 
providing "social support" for and "social control" of the 
policies of the government. The seventeen sub-districts 
(ketjamatan) in Simalungun are headed by administrative of­
ficials of the territorial bureaucracy who are appointed by 
the Regional Head. The lowest unit of government is the 
village or village complex (kepenghuluan), of which there 
are 530 in Simalungun. Each kepenghuluan is headed by an 
(in theory) popularly elected penghulu, who is responsible 
for the settlement of disputes within the village and serves 
both as the local agent of the central government and the 
spokesman for his people to the sub-district officer.
The regency of Simalungun is a multi-ethnic, econom­
ically diverse region which has been subject to a great 
deal of social change in recent history. Toward the end of 
the nineteenth century Simalungun consisted of a number of 
traditional kingdoms (keradjaan)* and was peopled by perhaps 
75,000 Simalungun or Eastern Batak, so called to distinguish 
them from the North Tapanuli Batak of Lake Toba and the 
Silindung Valley, the South Tapanuli Batak of Mandailing, 
Angkola and Sipirok, and the Karo Batak to the north; these 
groups speak generally mutually unintelligible languages.
The multi-ethnic characteristics of present-day 
Simalungun are in large part a result of the Liberal Policy 
of the colonial period, which encouraged private investment 
in Indonesia and led to the large-scale growth of European- 
owned rubber, tea, tobacco and palm-oil plantations in the 
east coast lowlands of Sumatra, including part of Simalungun 
(now consisting of the six subdistricts collectively called 
Lower Simalungun). Javanese were imported to work on the 
plantations and, in Lower Simalungun, soon outnumbered the 
indigenous people. North Tapanuli Batak, skilled in the 
techniques of wet rice agriculture, were encouraged by the 
Dutch to move into Simalungun to provide food for the plan­
tation workers. Many of them had received a rudimentary 
education in Christian missionary schools and secured em­
ployment as plantation and government clerks. As the North 
Tapanuli Batak came in and settled the best rice land, the 
less aggressive Simalungun people moved up into the less 
fertile foothills of the Bukit Barisan mountain range, an 
area which now comprises seven subdistricts and is called 
Upper Simalungun. During this period Pematangsiantar grew 
from a small village and seat of one of the traditional 
kingdoms into a commercial and administrative center large 
enough by the 1920fs to become a municipality. Trading pros­
pects attracted a great variety of immigrants, including
* See Appendix I, p. 28.
5Moslem Batak from South Tapanuli, Coastal Malays, Chinese and 
a smattering of people from other parts of the archipelago.
In contemporary Simalungun the principal social cleavages 
among the Indonesian population are ethnic. Four main groups 
are involved: the Simalungun Batak, comprising perhaps 30
per cent of the total population; the North Tapanuli Batak, 
about 20 per cent; the Javanese, about 20 per cent; and the 
South Tapanuli Batak, perhaps 15 per cent.* Patterns of 
cleavages crosscutting or consistent with the ethnic are com­
plex; we shall briefly describe two of the most important, 
religion and socio-economic class. The North Tapanuli and 
Simalungun Batak are predominantly Protestant Christian, al­
though the latter group contains significant Islamic, Roman 
Catholic and animistic minorities.2 3 4 For several decades one 
church, the HKBP (Huria Kristen Batak Protestan, Batak Pro­
testant Christian Church), served both groups, but in 1952 
the Simalungun Protestants, unhappy over what they felt to 
be North Tapanuli domination, became autonomous within the 
framework of the Batak church. In 1964, with the establish­
ment of the GKPS (Geredja Kristen Protestan Simalungun, 
Simalungun Protestant Christian Church), Simalungun Chris­
tians became totally independent of the HKBP. The Javanese 
and South Tapanuli Batak are Moslem, but there is a vast dif­
ference between the two groups in terms of their adherence 
to and practice of the Islamic faith. The great majority of 
Javanese in Simalungun are of the abangan persuasion, a more 
syncretistic, animistic and Hindu-influenced variant of Is­
lam, while the South Tapanuli people belong to the more pure­
ly Islamic santri element.^ It is largely this latter group 
which participates in religious activities, the Islamic 
educational system and Moslem social organizations.
In the post-independence period economic and occupational
2. The Chinese make up the bulk of the remaining 15 per cent. 
These percentages represent crude estimates based on cen­
sus data concerning religious affiliation and province of 
birth, and on informed guessing.
3. 51 per cent of the population of the seven subdistricts of 
Upper Simalungun is Protestant, 4.5 per cent is Catholic,
8.8 per cent is Moslem, and 35.6 per cent is animist 
("primitif"). Computed from data in Pemerintahan Daerah 
Tkt. II Simalungun, Lapuran Tahun 1963 (Government of the 
Second Level Region of Simalungun, Report for the Year 1963), 
P. Siantar, 1963, p. 115.
4. On the abangan-santri division, see Clifford Geertz, The
Religion of Java, Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press of Glencoe,
1960.
6cleavages consistent with the ethnic divisions have begun to 
break down as a result of urbanization and increasing educa­
tional opportunities. The North Tapanuli Batak remain, as 
a group, the most highly educated, and fill a disproportion­
ate number of government and plantation offices. They also, 
with the Chinese, dominate the shops and market stalls of 
Siantar, although in the last decade they have come under 
increasing pressure in this sphere from the Simalungun Batak. 
The South Tapanuli Batak are mostly traders, teachers in Is­
lamic schools, or government officials, particularly in the 
small towns ringing the plantations. The Javanese for the 
most part remain on the plantations as workers, although 
many of them have moved to Siantar and found employment as 
servants or unskilled laborers. Finally, the Simalungun 
Batak, while numerically the largest group in the regency, 
have only a very thin layer of educated, urbanized individ­
uals ; most of these are employed as ministers in the 
Simalungun church, school teachers, government officials 
and merchants.
In terms of residential patterns there is a relatively 
high degree of segregation along ethnic lines. Upper 
Simalungun is inhabited almost exclusively by Simalungun 
Batak, with some admixture of Karonese along its western 
border and North Tapanuli Batak in the south. Lower Simalungun 
contains Javanese and North and South Tapanuli Batak, but 
the Javanese live on the plantations, the North Tapanuli 
Batak in villages near the plantations and in the towns, and 
the South Tapanuli Batak mostly in the towns. The munici­
pality of Siantar, in pre-revolutionary days, consisted of 
two villages, bisected by a river: Kampung Kristen, inhab­
ited by North Tapanuli Batak; and Kampung Melaju, containing 
a majority of South Tapanuli Moslems and clusters of Javanese 
and others. This pattern is slowly breaking down, but in 
each of the ten 'village* units in contemporary Siantar one 
or another ethnic group predominates.
The relationship between ethnic cleavages and the polit­
ical party system in Simalungun/Siantar is complex, and it 
is an oversimplification to view party politics in the region 
as merely an extension of ethnic loyalties and conflicts. It 
is true, however, that there is a considerable measure of 
ethnic group identification with particular parties: North
Tapanuli Batak with Parkindo, South Tapanuli Batak with Mas- 
jumi, and the Javanese, although more divided in their parti­
san loyalties, with the PNI.5 Of the four major ethnic
5. The relationship between ethnicity and the party system in 
Simalungun/Siantar is a major theme of the author's disser- 
tation-in-progress, Politics in Simalungun: A Study in
Integration.
7communities only one, the Simalungun Batak, has failed to 
support a national party, i.e., a party with significant 
support outside the region and which has played, at one time 
or another, a role in national-level political life. The 
purpose of this paper is to explore the distinctive political 
development of the suku Simalungun and the attempts of its 
leaders to relate themselves and their community to the pol­
itics of independent Indonesia.
Social Change Amon^ the Simalungun Batak:
The Differentiation of Elites and the 
Development of Political Loyalties'
Before the arrival of the Dutch toward the close of the 
nineteenth century, political leadership in Simalungun was 
monopolized by a traditional aristocracy.6 Although compe­
tition for power between and within the kingdoms of Simalungun 
was apparently common in the pre-colonial period, it was ex­
clusively a game of the aristocracy. Invested with super- 
naturally-sanctioned authority (which defined the gap between 
elite and non-elite), they also dominated the religious and 
economic lives of their subjects. No alternative leadership 
groups or institutions existed in the society which might 
have mounted a challenge to their dominant position. Marga 
(sibs, exogamous patrilineal descent groups) and lineage seg­
ments, generally numerically small in any particular locality 
and/or integrated into the traditional power structure, lacked 
formal organization and were incapable of opposing the aris­
tocracy.
6. Sources on traditional government in Simalungun include 
the following:
Tideman, J., Simeloengen: Het land der Timoer-Bataks in
zijn vroegere isolatie en zijn ontwikkeling tot een deel 
van het cultuurgebied van de Oostkust van Sumatra 
(Simalungun: The Land of the Eastern Batak in its former
isolation and its development into a part of the plantation 
area of the East Coast of Sumatra), Leiden: S. 0. van
Doesburgh, 1922 ; Kroesen, J. A., tfEene reis door de land- 
schappen Tandjung Kassau, Siantar en Tanah Djawa, Residentie 
Oostkust van Sumatra," (A trip through the regions of 
Tandjung Kassau, Siantar and Tanah Djawa, East Coast of 
Sumatra Residency), Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land-, 
en Volkenkunde, Deel XXXIX, 1897, pp. 229-304; Kroesen,
A^  "Nota omtrent de Bataklanden (speciaal Simeloengen),u 
(A note on the Bataklands (especially Simalungun)), 
Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde,
Deel LXI, 1899, pp. 253-285.
8Dutch colonial rule brought rust en orde to Simalungun 
by prohibiting warfare among the keradjaan and by strength­
ening the position of the radja vis-a-vis lesser aristocrats 
At the same time, the Dutch presence sowed the seeds of 
future conflict by opening channels to individual advance­
ment within the society independent of the traditional elite 
Increasingly in the twentieth century there emerged a new 
elite group among the Simalungun Batak whose claim to in­
fluence rested not on traditional supernatural power but on 
modern education, leadership of the Christian and Islamic 
religious communities and, to a lesser extent, commercial 
and entrepreneurial success.
Modern education, introduced by European and North 
Tapanuli Batak Christian missionaries and Moslem ulama from 
South Tapanuli and East Sumatra, created a new civil ser­
vant class whose skills were required both by the Dutch in 
their government and plantation offices and by the tradi­
tional rulers in their own increasingly westernized adminis­
trations. The development of Pematangsiantar and other 
towns as commercial centers serving the needs of the plan­
tations and the much-enlarged population of the region 
simultaneously contributed to the rise of a small merchant 
and entrepreneurial class among the educated Simalungun 
Batak.
The growth of Christianity and (on a smaller scale) 
Islam also entailed the creation of an indigenous religious 
leadership centered in the church and church-school hier­
archies and in the Islamic madrasah and social organizations 
The authority of the new religious leaders was based on 
their knowledge of the new truths of the religions of Christ 
and Muhammad and, perhaps most importantly, on their pos­
session of the means to advancement in the secular world, 
a modern educational system. It was in general unrelated 
to the traditional aristocracy and divorced from its world­
view, which had heretofore provided the religious basis of 
the society, although a number of traditional rulers in 
Lower Simalungun embraced Islam early in the twentieth cen­
tury and made it in effect their state religion. Although 
the religious elite offered no challenges to the political 
power of the traditional aristocracy— Moslem leaders and 
religious teachers in particular were too closely tied to 
the radja and, in any event, Dutch power made challenges 
well-nigh impossible— its influence in the society was per­
vasive.
By the 1930fs, then, the traditional elite had begun to 
lose its grip on Simalungun society. While still dominant 
politically, its authority (particularly that of the radja 
over lesser aristocrats) was heavily dependent on Dutch
9support and only grudgingly accepted by the new elites which 
had achieved status in non-traditional spheres of activity. 
The Japanese occupation contributed further to the differen­
tiation of elites and the decline of the aristocracy. Higher 
positions in the plantation and government bureaucracies than 
had previously been open to them were given to Simalungun 
Batak (and other Indonesians). At the village level resent­
ment toward the aristocracy became more widespread, as the 
rulers participated in the organization of the infamous Japa­
nese forced labor system. Many villagers left home for the 
Japanese work gangs and never returned. Finally, military 
and para-military training combined with nationalist indoc­
trination greatly enlarged the group of young, partially- 
educated Simalungun Batak willing openly to oppose the con­
tinuation of traditional political institutions. When the 
Japanese withdrew, it was this latter group which dealt the 
death blow to the kingdoms of Simalungun.
Political loyalties in traditional Simalungun were pri­
marily territorial rather than based on kinship, and were 
directed toward the village and keradjaan in which the indi­
vidual resided and to whose rulers he was subject. The 
typical Simalungun Batak village contains a variety of marga 
and sub-marga groups, many of which are unrelated by marriage 
or descent. The basic unit of social interaction in the 
Simalungun village, the sanina, consists of the sons of ego's 
father or grandsons of his father's father and is not large 
enough or inclusive enough to provide a basis for village­
wide social organization. For assistance in clearing his 
fields and harvesting and processing his crops, for protec­
tion against attack by outsiders and against the depredations 
of evil spirits, the individual in traditional society was 
dependent on fellow villagers with whom he often had no kin­
ship ties and on the political leadership of the village and 
of the more inclusive units of which it was a part.
In the post-colonial period loyalties to village and 
keradjaan have continued in the form of regional identifica­
tions. Regionalism has been particularly strong in subdis­
trict Raja, where the Simalungun language is considered to 
be purest and whose nineteenth-century Radja Rondahaim is 
celebrated as an anti-colonial hero, and in subdistrict Purba, 
once the target of Rondahaim's expansionism. It has become 7
7. Simalungun Batak recognize four Simalungun marga: Saragih,
Damanik, Purba and Sinaga. Each of these is further divided 
into several sub-marga, e. g., Purba Siboro, Saragih 
Garingging. On the origins of the Simalungun marga, see 
J. Wismar Saragih, "Silsilah Marga2 di Simalungun," (A 
Chronicle of the Marga in Simalungun), unpub. paper pre­
sented to the Seminar on Simalungun Culture, P. Siantar, 
1964.
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increasingly common to find individuals who identify them- 
selves'both by marga and region (e. g. , Johannes Purba-Raja, 
signifying marga Purba from subdistrict Raja) rather than 
simply by marga or sub-marga. The division of the Simalungun 
Protestant Christian Church (GKPS) into three districts (one 
centered in Raja, one in Purba and the third encompassing 
the rest of Simalungun and East Sumatra) also reflects the 
cleavage between the two areas, as does the church's concern 
to maintain a regional balance in its central leadership.
Supra-village kinship ties have generally been weak and 
ineffectual as determinants of political loyalties. In the 
pre-colonial period communication between keradjaan was dif­
ficult and infrequent, genealogies were not kept, and ties 
with relatives who migrated from one area to another were 
quickly lost. Despite improved communications and increased 
travel the Simalungun Batak has continued to identify pri­
marily with his village and only secondarily with fellow 
members of his sub-marga or marga. In recent years a few 
attempts have been made to establish marga associations in 
Siantar and Medan. These associations, at least in Siantar, 
have had a negligible effect on social organization within 
the Simalungun Batak community. In some cases, however, 
particularly where marga divisions have coincided in part 
with territorial loyalties (e. g., the large number of mem­
bers of sub-marga Purba Pakpak in the former keradjaan of 
Purba and of various subdivisions of marga Saragih in 
keradjaan Raja), regional cleavages have had some kinship 
overtones.
Traditional cleavages in Simalungun society, whether 
regional or kinship-based, have been greatly mitigated in 
the twentieth century by the emergence of new reference 
groups which cut across rather than reinforce the older 
divisions. With the introduction of Christianity and Islam 
many Simalungun Batak of all marga and regions turned to the 
new religious leadership for guidance in secular as well as 
in spiritual affairs.8 Others, particularly in the more 
remote villages relatively unaffected by the events of the 
twentieth century, remained undivided in their loyalties to 
the anoien regime. Since the traditional aristocracy every­
where tolerated and sometimes closely cooperated with the 
religious leaders, this cleavage never developed into open
8. The (anonymous) Simalungun Batak author of the official 
GKPS history of Christianity in Simalungun, 60 Tahun 
Indjil Kristus di Simalungun (Sixty Years of the Gospel 
of Christ m  Simalungun), p. Siantar, 1963, wrote that 
"seeing the Christians who were always going to church 
there were those who were of the opinion that the radja 
of the Christians was the minister, because his regula­
tions were always followed.” p. 24.
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hostility, either at the village level or between the two elite 
groups.
During the Japanese occupation and the nationalist revo­
lution, still another segment of the Simalungun populace 
rejected both the traditional and the religious elites in 
favor1 of the new revolutionary leadership in organizations 
such as Barisan Harimau Liar (Wild Tiger Legion, a PNI- 
affiliated guerilla organization with an almost entirely 
Simalungun Batak membership in the region). This final 
cleavage, which reached its greatest intensity in the Social 
Revolution of 1946,9 ran much deeper in Simalungun society, 
as it required many individuals to take a direct stand for or 
^gainst the traditional elite. Although strongest in kerad- 
jaan Purba and parts of keradjaan Pane bordering on Lake Toba, 
the revolutionary group included members of all four Sima­
lungun Batak marga and subjects of every keradjaan in 
Simalungun.
Finally, all of these cleavages, the traditional and the 
modern, have been tempered by the position of the Simalungun 
Batak as a minority group in their homeland. Of a total 
regency/municipality population estimated at nearly 650,000 
in 1963 and a provincial population of over five million, 
probably fewer than 200,000 are Simalungun Batak. In the 
nineteenth century there was little unity among the Simalungun 
people, who identified themselves as residents of a particular 
village and subjects of a particular keradjaan rather than as 
members of a common ethnic group. Hostility toward the
9. The Social Revolution in Simalungun began on the night of 
March 3, 1946, when four radja (Raja, Purba, Pane and Sili- 
makuta) and many lesser aristocrats and members of their 
families were killed. The radja of Dolok Silau was protec­
ted by his subjects and escaped assassination, as did the 
radja of Siantar and Tanah Djawa who were in the city of 
Siantar at the time. The Social Revolution (at least in 
Simalungun) was not a popular uprising or an expression of 
mass hatred. Rather it was a well-planned, carefully exe­
cuted series of assassinations organized by a few armed 
youth groups and carried out almost entirely in the course 
of one night. The identity of the specific groups and indi­
viduals who participated in the Social Revolution is still 
unclear because of the secrecy which surrounded the assass­
inations and the reluctance of the participants to talk 
about the period. The consensus of opinion among informants 
who were active revolutionaries or civil servants in Sima­
lungun at the time was that the most important role in both 
the planning and execution of the assassinations was played 
by BHL; pro-Communist and other youth groups were probably 
also involved, particularly in Lower Simalungun.
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non-Simalungun Batak, although it certainly existed, was seen 
not as something pitting one ethnic group against another 
but as pitting one village or kingdom against another; it 
was in any case largely confined to the border areas. It 
was not until the migrations of the twentieth century that 
the Simalungun Batak, increasingly in competition with indi­
viduals from different cultures, begin to feel a sense of 
ethnic unity based on common language, culture and member­
ship in one of the four Simalungun marga. The intensity of 
this new identification varied from individual to individual 
depending upon the nature and extent of cultural contact, 
but by the end of the colonial period few Simalungun Batak 
were unaware of their common identity and of the differences 
between them and the various migrant groups. As a result of 
these differences and of the threat presented by non-Simalungun 
Batak influential in the economic and political life of the 
region, kesatuan Simalungun— Simalungun unity— became a 
principal theme of post-independence political activity.
The 1950's:^ The Rise and Fall of 
Ethnic Political Organizations
After a brief lull following the dismantling of the 
Dutch-sponsored State of East Sumatra (NST), Simalungun Batak 
politicians began to prepare for the coming election campaign. 
The community's political leadership was divided into three 
broad groups: the remnants of the traditional aristocracy
and other individuals sympathetic to the idea of a political 
organization which would directly represent the Simalungun 
Batak; the religious leadership, and the former leaders of 
militantly revolutionary organizations. Simalungun Batak 
civil servants, merchants and entrepreneurs did not form a 
separate bloc but instead affiliated themselves with one of 
the three groups.
Most members of the first group of leaders became active 
in KRSST (Kebangunan Rakjat Simalungun Sumatera Timur, The 
Awakening of the Simalungun People of East Sumatra), an ethnic 
organization restricted to the Simalungun Batak community.10 
KRSST's objective was to obtain a seat in the national Parlia­
ment or, failing that, representation in the proposed North
10. Another ethnic organization, AKRAP ST (Aksi Rakjat Pemilih 
Sumatera Timur, Action of the Voting People of East 
Sumatra), designed to appeal to all the indigenous peoples 
of East Sumatra (Simalungun Batak, Karo Batak and Coastal 
Malays) also contested the elections. In Simalungun 
AKRAP ST won only 1,776 votes, one third of which were 
cast in subdistrict Dolok Pardamaian, the home of the 
organization's Simalungun chairman.
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Sumatran provincial legislature on behalf of the entire Sima- 
lungun Batak community. Financed by a wealthy Simalungun 
Batak businessman in Djakarta, Hadji Djaramil Damarik, 1 the 
organization was led in the region by Badja Purba, the former 
head of Dolok Batunanggar, a subdivision of keradjaan Pane.
Its leadership at the regency and subdistrict levels cut 
across most of the cleavages described in the preceding sec­
tion, including former aristocrats and non-aristocrats from 
all regions and of all marga as well as Christians, Moslems 
(including the head of Dolok Batunanggar and the Djakarta 
businessman), and the followers of traditional religious 
practices. Only the militant revolutionaries and their sup­
porters remained entirely aloof.
The religious elite was divided in its partisan loyalties. 
The Protestant leadership was heavily cross-pressured, torn 
between a desire to support the party of Protestantism 
(Parkindo) and yet deeply sympathetic to the objectives of 
KRSST. For many years Protestant leaders had opposed North 
Tapanuli influence in their church. By 1952, with the estab­
lishment of the HKBP-S, they had succeeded in gaining autonomy 
within the Batak church, but their final goal— total separation—  
was not to be achieved for another decade. To many of them 
Parkindo was not much more than the political extension of 
the HKBP, and was similarly dominated by North Tapanuli Batak. 
They saw little possibility of an influential role for Sima- 
lungun Batak in Parkindo. Some ministers and teachers re­
solved their internal conflict by limiting their political 
propaganda to anti-Communist and, less frequently, anti-PNI 
sermons and speeches. Smaller groups came out boldly for 
Parkindo or for KRSST. Since Simalungun Batak Catholic lay 
leaders in subdistrict Purba played a prominent role in the 
regency leadership of Partai Katholik, the Catholic leader­
ship found it less difficult to resolve the conflict between 
church and suku. By supporting Partai Katholik one could be 
pro-suku and pro-church at the same time.
The Moslem elite was also divided. Nahdatul Ulama was 
established by Simalungun Batak who had been closely associated 
with the traditional aristocracy and had participated in NST.
With the support of the Simalungun Moslem community and what­
ever other ethnic groups (such as Coastal Malays and Javanese) 
could be attracted to the party, and the financial assistance 
of NU’s national leadership, they hoped to carve an indepen­
dent role for themselves in local politics. Other Moslems, 
similar in background to the NU leaders, felt that a party 
based largely on an appeal to perhaps fifteen per cent of the 
ethnic group would be too small to play an effective role 
either in Simalungun or in the national NU organization, and 1
11. He was later to become a Vice-Minister in the PRRI rebel 
government.
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gave their support instead to KRSST. Finally, Simalungun 
Moslem leaders who had fought against the Dutch found both 
KRSST and NU unattractive and turned to Masjumi.
The secular revolutionary leadership was less divided 
in its partisan affiliation than the religious elite. Most 
Simalungun Batak who had participated in the Revolution were 
members of Barisan Harimau Liar. In the early 1950's the 
former leaders of BHL who continued to be politically active 
were, with few exceptions, PNI supporters and leaders.
The results of the 1955 elections showed that the 
Simalungun Batak community, and particularly its Protestant 
and animistic sub-groups, was highly receptive to the idea 
of direct political representation of the ethnic group.
KRSST's leaders had framed their appeal not in terms of 
loyalty to the traditional aristocracy or a restoration of 
traditional rule (which they knew to be impossible) but 
rather on the basis of ethnic solidarity in opposition to 
the migrant groups. Its popularity in Upper Simalungun was 
comparable to the support which the ostensibly non-ethnic 
parties Parkindo, Masjumi and PNI received from the North 
Tapanuli, South Tapanuli and Javanese communities respec­
tively. In the seven subdistricts of Upper Simalungun KRSST's 
mean percentage of the vote was 43.7 per cent, and the party 
won a clear majority in Raja and Silau Kahean. In the 
regnecy as a whole, with 8.3 per cent of the vote, it was 
the fifth largest party. (See Table 1)
The second most popular party in Upper Simalungun was 
the PNI, with a mean 19.8 per cent of the vote. The PNI's 
support was concentrated in subdistricts Silimakuta and 
Dolok Silau (where many of the voters were Karo Batak) and 
subdistricts Dolok Pardamaian and Purba, both of which were 
former BHL strongholds. The low PNI vote in Raja (7.8 per 
cent) reflected not the regional cleavage between Raja and 
Purba but rather the absence in that subdistrict of indige­
nous BHL-PNI leadership. (The best-known leader of BHL in 
Raja left North Sumatra soon after the Revolution.) Of the 
remaining parties, Parkindo won a mean 9.3 per cent of the 
vote in Upper Simalungun (with its greatest support in Raja, 
Raja Kahean and Dolok Pardamaian) and Masjumi obtained 7.2 
per cent, which included most of the Simalungun Batak Mos­
lem voters in the region and a substantial proportion of 
non-Simalungun Batak in Silau Kahean and Raja Kahean. Partai 
Katholik's vote, less than 4 per cent of the regional total, 
was concentrated in subdistrict Purba. NU received negli­
gible support in Upper Simalungun, with most of its small 
vote in the regency/municipality coming from Siantar city 
and the Lower Simalungun subdistricts of Bandar, Bosar Mali- 
gas, Tanah Djawa and Sidamanik.
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Table 1
The KRSST Vote in Simalungun in the 
1955 Parliamentary Elections
Subdistrict KRSST Vote 
(as % of subd. vote)
Raja 61.8%
Silau Kahean 51.3
Purba 43.8
Dolok Silau 43.7
Raja Kahean 37.6
Silimakuta 29.1
Dolok Pardamaian 22.7
Subtotal: Upper Simalungun 43.7
All Other Subdistricts (Mean) 3.2
Total: Simalungun Regency 8.3
Siantar City 2.0
Source: Adapted from Pemerintahan Daerah Tkt. II Sima­
lungun, Daftar: Perhitungan hasi!2 pemungutan
suara dalam daerah KabUpaten SimalungUn/Pemilihan 
Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat, 29 Sept., 1955 
(Government of the Second Level Region of Sima­
lungun, A list of the election results in the 
Regency of Simalungun/Election of the Members of 
the People’s Representative Council).
Table 2
The Vote for PNI, Parkindo and Masjumi in 
Upper Simalungun, by Subdistrict (%)
Subdistrict PNI Parkindo Masjumi
Raja 7.8% 14.5% 6.0%Dolok Pardamaian 28.7 12.4 2.4
Purba 20.6 8.9 .4
Silimakuta 42.9 3.9 1.9Dolok Silau 37.8 4.8 .2
Silau Kahean 4.9 2.9 23.0
Raja Kahean 9.0 13.5 20.6
Total 19.8 9.3 7.2
Source: See Table 1.
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Despite its sizable vote in Upper Simalungun, KRSST 
failed to achieve its objectives of national and/or pro­
vincial representation. By 1957, when the first regency 
DPRD12 was inaugurated, its most prominent leadership had 
turned to other activities and organizations, allowing 
second-rank leaders to fill its three DPRD seats. Until 
formally dissolved in 1961,13 KRSST existed in name only, 
with no leadership other than its representatives in the 
DPRD and no organization in the subdistricts.
In December 1956 the North Sumatran army command 
stationed in Medan rebelled against the central govern­
ment.14 Although the rebels were quickly driven out of 
East Sumatra and into the highlands of North Tapanuli, the 
authority of the government was not fully restored in many 
rural areas of Simalungun until 1959. In these unsettled 
conditions a new organization called Rondahaim (after the 
former Radja of Raja) was created in Upper Simalungun by 
former KRSST activists. Rondahaim1s goals were twofold:
(1) to provide protection to the Simalungun Batak com­
munity through its own para-military force and by estab­
lishing liaison with both rebel and government troops; and
(2) to promote economic development in Upper Simalungun 
by organizing such projects as road building and school 
and market construction. Because of its sometimes heavy- 
handed attitude toward the local population, its tendency 
to dragoon villagers into its work gangs, and the fact 
that nearly all of its leaders were from Raja, Rondahaim 
was never widely supported. With the gradual return of 
security and the government presence in Upper Simalungun 
Rondahaim soon disappeared.
The army rebellion and its defeat precipitated a shift
12. The DPRD was the predecessor of the present-day DPRD-GR, 
established in 1961. Membership in the DPRD was deter­
mined on the basis of each party’s percentage of total 
regency votes in the 1955 Parliamentary elections. In 
the DPRD-GR, half of the seats are allotted to the par­
ties, half to golongan karya (functional groups).
13. Under Presidential Edict No. 7/1959 on the simplifica­
tion of the party system. See Departemen Penerangan 
Republik Indonesia, Almanak Lembaga-Lembaga Negara dan 
Kepartaian, Djakarta, 1961, pp. 423-4-26.
14. For a detailed analysis of the military situation in 
North Sumatra in 1956-57 see Smail, John R. W., "The 
Military Politics of North Sumatra, December 1956- 
October 1957", unpub. paper, Cornell University, n.d.
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in political power in North Sumatra from civilian government 
to the military, and within the military from one faction to 
another. A state of war and seige (SOB), giving the army 
vastly increased powers over civilian government, was de­
clared and not formally ended until 1963. Since the rebellious 
army officers were mostly North Tapanuli Batak, this group 
as a whole came under suspicion and its military and civilian 
leaders went into eclipse in provincial politics. Under the 
new army commander. Col. Djamin Gintings, a Karo Batak, the 
indigenous peoples of East Sumatra began to press claims for 
the division of North Sumatra into two provinces: East Sumatra,
to be run by Karo and Simalungun Batak and Coastal Malays; 
and Tapanuli, to be left to the North and South Tapanuli Batak.
The organizational expression of the movement for East 
Sumatran autonomy was BAPOST (Badan Penuntut Otonomi Sumatera 
Timur, Body to Demand East Sumatran Autonomy), established 
some months prior to the army rebellion but not really active 
until 1957. In Simalungun, where it had branches at the 
Regency/municipality and subdistrict levels, BAPOSTfs leader­
ship was more inclusive than that of previous ethnic-based 
organizations. Besides including members of the small Karo 
Batak and Coastal Malay communities, BAPOST was widely sup­
ported by the Simalungun Batak political elite irrespective 
of religious, regional and traditional-revolutionary cleavages. 
Only the few Simalungun Batak in the PKI, under party instruc­
tions, refused to support the movement. Within the PNI the 
emergence of BAPOST provided the first signs of dissension.
Most Simalungun Batak in the regency and subdistrict PNI 
leadership became active BAPOST leaders, while the North and 
South Tapanuli Batak and Javanese in the party lent their 
support to GAS (Gerakan Anti-Separatis, Anti-Separatist Move­
ment), an organization created to oppose BAPOST. Simalungun 
Batak affiliated with Parkindo also supported the movement 
for autonomy, increasing their alienation from the dominant 
North Tapanuli leadership (who, under suspicion as possible 
rebels, abstained from all political activity in this period). 
Despite apparent high-level support (particularly within the 
military), mass meetings, demonstrations and implied threats 
of violence, the demand for a separate East Sumatra was in 
the end unacceptable to the central government and BAPOST 
went the way of KRSST and Rondahaim.*5 In its wake it left 15
15. By 1963-64 the issue of East Sumatran autonomy was dead 
as far as East Sumatrans were concerned, for their objec­
tives had largely been realized. Although the provincial 
military commander was a Javanese, most military officers 
with territorial authority or command of troops in East 
Sumatra were indigenous East Sumatrans (with a high per­
centage of Karo Batak). In the sphere of civilian govern­
ment, the North Sumatran governor was a Karo Batak and
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an intensified sense of ethnic identity both among the Sima- 
lungun Batak and among their opponents. As the last of the 
ethnic organizations, it also left an organizational vacuum 
in Upper Simalungun.
The 1960fs: An Organizational Vacuum
The fall of BAPOST signified the beginning of a new 
era in ethnic politics in Simalungun in which the organiza­
tional link between the Simalungun Batak villager and the 
urban political elite was practically non-existent, but 
ethnic influence in regency government markedly increased.
In the 1950fs ethnic organizations had proved singularly 
ineffective as means for gaining influence in government.
The experience of KRSST had shown that, while an ethnic 
political party could win the support of a considerable 
segment of the Simalungun people, there were simply too 
few Simalungun Batak to enable such an organization to dom­
inate regency politics, let alone play a role on the pro­
vincial or national stage. Equally important, the dissolu­
tion of KRSST and the failure of BAPOST made it abundantly 
clear that overt sukuism and regionalism were unacceptable 
to the national government. By the end of the decade Sima­
lungun Batak politicians had lost their taste for ethnic 
organizations as such.
The organizational vacuum left by the decline and sub­
sequent dissolution of KRSST has not been filled by any of 
the remaining parties. Regency-level party leaders have, 
in fact, paid less attention to Upper Simalungun than to 
any other part of the regency. While minimal organizational 
structures have been maintained, no attempts have been made 
to create mass membership parties or subsidiary organizations 
with regular programs of activity reaching into the daily 
lives of the population. Nor has there been a continuous 
link between the urban party leaders and the village popu­
lation whom they claim to represent in party and government 
councils. Parkindofs regency leadership, including its 
Simalungun Batak member, has almost totally ignored the sub­
district party leaders in Upper Simalungun. NU, Partai 
Katholik and the PKI have also been largely inactive in the 
region. Simalungun Batak in the branch PNI organization
most second-level Regional Heads were East Sumatrans, 
many of them born in the regencies and municipalities 
which they headed. The autonomy shoe was now on the 
other foot, and demands for the separation of North 
Sumatra into two provinces began to be heard from the 
North Tapanuli Batak. In early 1964 a resolution to 
this effect was passed by the DPRD-GR of North Tapanuli. 
For discussion of the autonomy movement at the East 
Sumatran level, see Smail, oj>. cit. , pp. 36-39 .
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have communicated more frequently with the subdistrict and 
village leadership, whose support they need at Party Confer­
ences, but they have for the most part neglected the tasks 
of party- and organization-building. In the late 1950fs and 
I9601s, some Simalungun Batak in Siantar became active in 
IPKI (mainly former KRSST supporters and descendants of the 
aristocracy), Murba and to a lesser extent Partindo (former 
revolutionaries), but they made no substantial effort to 
organize in the villages.
The failure of the national political parties to develop 
a mass base in Upper Simalungun has not been entirely the 
fault of the regency party leadership, for each of the nation­
al parties is limited in terms of its potential support.
Roman Catholics and Moslems are too few to enable Partai 
Katholik and NU to play a prominent role in the region, and 
Parkindo has been handicapped by its identification with the 
North Tapanuli Batak community. Among the large percentage 
of the village population which supported KRSST and felt 
little enmity toward the traditional aristocracy, there has 
been active hostility toward the revolutionary leaders of the 
PNI, PKI, Murba and Partindo. The PKI has been further bur­
dened by its identification with atheism and its unwilling­
ness to represent ethnic interests, such as the demand for 
East Sumatran autonomy. IPKITs leaders, while of aristo­
cratic blood and formerly supporters of KRSST, are either 
civil servants or youths without substantial political ex­
perience or contacts in the villages. The first-rank lead­
ers of KRSST have in the 1960fs turned away from politics 
altogether.
In the absence of partisan links, upward communication 
between the Upper Simalungun villager and the regency govern­
ment has been severely hampered. Official government chan- . 
nels, in the persons of the subdistrict officer (appointed 
by the Regional Head in his capacity as regent) and the vil­
lage head (according to law popularly elected), have not 
provided an effective alternative to the party organizations. 
The relationship between the subdistrict officer and the 
village head has been largely formal and paternalistic. . 
During the Revolution and for some years afterward most sub­
district officers in Upper Simalungun were outsiders who did 
not speak the Simalungun language. In recent years these 
posts have been given primarily to Simalungun Batak, but 
their function— to represent the central government to the 
people rather than the people to the government— has, in the 
eyes of the villagers, remained the same. Communication be­
tween the subdistrict officer and the people within his juris­
diction is largely limited to meetings with the village heads, 
called to convey instructions emanating from the Regional 
Head or his superiors. The village head tends to be some­
what awed in the presence of higher authority, and his sense
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of subordination is increased by the formality of the set­
ting, his imperfect understanding of the Indonesian language 
(used as the official language at such meetings) and by the 
fact that the subdistrict officer is normally flanked by 
the subdistrict representatives of the police and army.
The village head also knows from personal experience 
that attempts to soften the impact of government instruc­
tions (e. g., a reduction in the quantity of rice which his 
village must supply to the government at a fixed price below 
the market value) or to make other requests of the subdis­
trict officer will be mostly unavailing. In one case a 
village in subdistrict Raja had been trying to obtain govern­
ment assistance in the building of a road for seven years 
without success. In this instance the main channel used 
by the villagers was the official village head-subdistrict 
officer link, although direct representation to regency 
and even provincial administrators had also been made. The 
local military and police representatives, most of whom are 
not Simalungun Batak and do not live in the subdistrict to 
which they are posted, are even less useful as channels 
for the expression of village demands than the subdistrict 
officer.
Even the village head is often regarded in Upper Sima­
lungun as the last link in the downward chain of command 
rather than the first link in an upward chain of represen­
tation. Although he is popularly elected or— as has been 
the case when vacancies have occurred in recent years-- 
chosen by the subdistrict officer after consultation with 
prominent villagers, the consolidation of small villages 
or hamlets into village complexes for purposes of adminis­
trative efficiency has meant that to many of his constituents 
the village head is an outsider.
The village complex of Baringin Raja in subdistrict 
Raja, for example, consists of five separate hamlets. In 
the last village election, held in 1953, three candidates, 
one from each of the three largest hamlets, were nominated 
for the post of village head. The vote was divided along 
hamlet lines, with the candidate from the largest hamlet 
emerging victorious. In 1964, when the author visited 
Baringin Raja, the village head was held in low esteem, 
particularly outside his own hamlet. Considered primarily 
a tax- and rice-collector and bearer of instructions, he 
rarely visited the other hamlets under his authority and 
played no role in their internal affairs. Hamlet disputes 
were taken to him as a last resort and only after all at­
tempts at mediation by family members and village elders 
learned in the adat had failed. According to the villagers, 
who jealously guarded their traditions of hamlet autonomy, 
such failures were extremely rare.
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The subdistrict and village branches of the Front Nasional, 
an institution created to provide a channel for the dissemina­
tion of official propaganda and to enable the government to 
exercise greater control over the activities of the political 
parties, have also been ineffective as instruments for the 
expression of popular demands. In the subdistricts of Upper 
Simalungun, FN members (appointed by the Regional Head upon 
recommendations from the subdistrict officer) are mostly un­
affiliated with the political parties, reside in the subdis­
trict capital and have little contact with the villages.
The seventeen-member FN anak tjabang (sub-branch) in Raja, 
for example, consisted of the subdistrict officer (as chair­
man), the army representative, two representatives from the 
PNI, one representative each from the PKI, Parkindo and Par- 
tindo, six non-party school teachers and civil servants, the 
Protestant minister, two non-party farmers and one Raja 
businessman. It met infrequently and then only for the pur­
pose of receiving instructions from the regency Front Nasional.
In the village the FN ranting (section) membership 
(appointed by the subdistrict officer on recommendations 
from the village head) usually contains a selection of vil­
lage elders, church lay leaders, the local schoolteacher 
and, where they exist, political party representatives. Its 
use has been limited to its function as the terminal point 
for the dissemination of FN pamphlets and newsletters, whose 
contents are supposed to be passed on orally to the villagers. 
Most FN ranting members do not bother to read this literature, 
which they regard as irrelevant to their own and their vil­
lage’s problems.
Without effective political organizations or official 
governmental channels of communication, contact between the 
village and the regency government tends to be based on per­
sonal relationships. The link between the villager who goes 
to Siantar to make a request on behalf of his village and 
the government official or other member of the political elite 
who receives him may be the tie of family, village, region, 
past association or merely common membership in the ethnic 
group. Since the appointment of a Simalungun Batak as Region­
al Head (see below) the range of officials amenable to such 
contacts is fairly broad. Although not a party leader or 
member, the villager may also state his case to a party 
politician or member of the DPRD-GR who is a Simalungun Batak, 
or to an official of the church who will relay it to the ap­
propriate government official. These channels have been em­
ployed much more commonly in recent years than they had been 
in the 1950fs but with only limited success. A principal 
obstacle to the success of this informal and personal kind 
of representation, as to that of party-related representation, 
has been the relative powerlessness of the regency government 
and the lack of resources with which it can meet local demands.
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During the period of martial law (1957-1963) the regional 
military commanders were of somewhat greater importance to the 
Simalungun Batak community as a source of social and political 
action. In Siantar city the army’s regional commander from 
1955 to 1958, Major T. S. Mardjana Saragih, was a Simalungun 
Batak.16 In the period of greatest insecurity in the country­
side, he became the critical link between the many villagers 
who fled Upper Simalungun for the safety of the city and the 
municipality government. As the ultimate possessor of author­
ity under SOB, he was able to secure land and building permits 
and day-laborer jobs in the city government for the refugees. 
The combined regency/municipality army commander from 1961 to 
1963, Major Jansen Saragih, was also a Simalungun Batak, and 
several local development projects, particularly the building 
of village schools, were carried out with his assistance.
Plans for the construction of a commercially valuable connect­
ing road between Raja and Sindarraja in subdistrict Raja 
Kahean under the army’s civic mission program were also initia­
ted by the army commander (who was a grandson of the former 
Radja of Raja) in this period. With the return to full civil­
ian authority in 1963 the power and freedom of action permit­
ted to the army leadership in Simalungun/Siantar diminished 
considerably. When a Karo Batak, Major Narangi Purba,17 was 
subsequently appointed regional military commander, the link 
which this office had provided between the villagers of Upper 
Simalungun and the regency political process was broken.
Regency-Level Leadership: 
The Search for Unity Continues
While the Simalungun Batak political elite in Siantar 
has failed to develop an organizational base in the villages 
in recent years, its influence in regency-wide politics has 
increased considerably. The turning point in the group’s 
fortunes came in 1960 with the appointment, after nomination 
by the DPRD, of a Simalungun Batak army officer, Major 
Radjamin Purba, as Regional Head. A Protestant (but married 
to a Moslem), born in the former keradjaan of Purba, and 
somewhat distantly related to the radja, the new Regional 
Head was a professional soldier who had spent most of his 
adult life in Java. Already well-connected nationally and
16. This post was abolished in 1961 when the regency and 
municipality were combined to form a single military 
region.
17. Among the Karo, the Purba are regarded as a sub-marga 
of the Marga Tarigan; they are in no way connected with 
the Simalungun Purba.
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with the provincial military leadership in Medan, his most 
critical problem was to build support in Simalungun. His 
first concern was to establish himself as a leader of his 
own ethnic community without, insofar as this was possible, 
alienating non-Simalungun Batak members of the regency poli­
tical elite or jeopardizing his support in Medan and Djakar­
ta. He adopted a strategy of cultivating both the Sima­
lungun Batak urban elite (of nearly all parties and organ­
izations) and simultaneously developing personal support in 
the villages independent of the party politicians.
The Regional Headfs first major project after his in­
auguration, important for its symbolic as well as its prac­
tical value, was the asphalting of the Haranggaol-Tiga 
Runggu road in Upper Simalungun. This project produced the 
first clash with PKI and (non-Simalungun Batak) PNI leaders 
in the DPRD, who were already opposed to him because of his 
provincial and national allies. In the ensuing years he 
continued his activities in Upper Simalungun, assisting in 
economic development projects such as the privately-financed 
planting of orange groves, arranging periodically for the 
supply of agricultural implements, seeds and fertilizer to 
the village population at fixed government prices, and so on. 
Where possible, he appointed Simalungun Batak subdistrict 
officers and other officials, such as the Head of the General 
Government Department (the immediate superior of the sub­
district officers), and he lobbied successfully in Medan for 
the appointment of Simalungun Batak to the posts of Head of 
Cultural Inspection and Head of the Agrarian Service. He has 
also been active in adat affairs, and in 1964 organized and 
financed an impressive and well-attended ceremony in which 
a prominent aristocratic ancestorfs remains were moved to an 
elaborate new resting place.
The 1964 Seminar on Simalungun Culture, of which the 
Regional Head and other Simalungun Batak politicians were 
the chief organizers, provides an excellent illustration of 
the care taken to balance the need for ethnic support with 
the requirements of the national polity. The motto of the 
Seminar, hung>over the main street of Siantar, was: Berantas
Kebudajaan Asing, Bina Kebudajaan Nasional Bersumber Kebudajaan 
Daerah (Combat Foreign Culture, Build National Culture Rooted 
in Regional Culture). The first part of the motto reflected 
a campaign, instigated by the PKI and supported by President 
Sukarno and several political parties, to prohibit the im­
portation of Western films and other paraphernalia of popular 
Western culture into Indonesia, the second part paid homage 
to Indonesian nationalism, and the third part was intended 
to win the support of the Simalungun Batak community.
In the selection of Seminar participants, the organizers 
were careful to exclude or to give only subordinate roles to
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individuals linked with the traditional aristocracy and for­
mer KRSST activists, as well as some former leaders of BAPOST 
who were thought to be too openly ”suku-minded”. The result 
was to diminish the value of the Seminar as a scholarly 
conference designed to explore Simalungun culture (since 
the most prominent adat specialists were mostly former aris­
tocrats and KRSST supporters) but to enhance its value as a 
demonstration to Djakarta (Ruslan Abdulgani, then Minister 
of Information, gave the opening speech on behalf of the 
government) of the sukufs contributions to the Revolution 
and its loyalty to the regime. Despite the exclusion of 
!Tnon-revolutionaryfT political leaders, the Seminar was well 
attended by delegates from all subdistricts with a substan­
tial Simalungun Batak population and contributed handsomely 
to the organizers’ reputations in the villages.
The Regional Head’s greatest opportunity to unite 
the Simalungun Batak political elite under his leadership 
occurred shortly after his inauguration in 1960, when the 
old DPRD was abolished and machinery for the establishment 
of the new DPRD-GR was set in motion. Two nominees for 
each seat in the new body (to be divided among party and 
functional group representatives) were requested from all 
legal parties and organizations with the final choices to 
be made by the Governor of North Sumatra on the recommenda­
tions of the Regional Head of Simalungun and the provincial 
military commander (who was in turn to receive recommenda­
tions from the regency/municipality military commander).
From each party and organization the Regional Head requested, 
and in most cases received, at least one Simalungun Batak 
nominee. For unorganized functional groups such as Adat, 
National Entrepreneurs, Cooperatives (of which there were 
many different kinds with no peak organization) and the 
Protestant and Catholic Religious Leadership he played a 
leading role in the actual selection of nominees. His sup­
port for NU and IPKI representation in the DPRD-GR (neither 
party had members in the DPRD) was also crucial. In the 
end, after months of complicated bargaining within the 
regency cstly with the parties) and at the provincial 
level (mostly within the military), Simalungun Batak repre­
sentation was increased from eight to fourteen, including 
two NU members, one member each from Parkindo, PKI, IPKI 
and Partai Katholik, and the representatives of the Police, 
Veterans (also a PNI leader), Protestant and Catholic 
Religious Leadership, Women (the chairman of the PNI’s 
Wanita Demokrat), National Entrepreneurs (a PNI leader), 
Cooperatives and Adat (a KRSST representative in the old 
DPRD).18 The army’s seat in the new body went to a Karo
18. In the old DPRD there were three Simalungun Batak mem­
bers from KRSST and one each from the PNI, Parkindo, 
Masjumi, Partai Katholik and PSI.
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Batak.
Since the inauguration of the DPRD-GR, cooperation be­
tween the "Simalungun bloc”19 and the Regional Head has been 
close and, on matters of secondary concern to the party 
leadership, fairly effective. The bloc obtained informal 
representation on every committee of the DPRD-GR, enabling 
its members to keep the Regional Head informed of all com­
mittee activities designed to undermine his position or 
oppose his policies. It also lent support in committee and 
in the full Council to the Regional Headfs annual budget 
recommendations and backed various projects, such as the 
acquisition of plantation concessions, as a means of in­
creasing regency government revenues, and the production of 
a film on the Revolution in Simalungun, which he proposed.
Despite common ethnicity and the personal obligations 
of the Simalungun Batak members to the Regional Head, with­
out whose support they would not have been appointed, the 
bloc has not been able to unite on important issues, par­
ticularly with regard to the selection of government person­
nel. As ethnic differences have constituted the chief 
nexus of factionalism within the parties,20 so the principal 
obstacle to ethnic unity in the DPRD-GR has been loyalty 
to party. In the most extreme case, the PKIfs Simalungun 
Batak DPRD-GR member has refused to attend the occasional 
meetings of the bloc or to cooperate with it in any way.
The PNI's Simalungun Batak were more willing to promote bloc 
activities and even assumed informal positions of leader­
ship within it. In 1963, however, they overstepped the 
boundaries of party discipline by signing a letter support­
ing the candidacy of the Regional Head for the Governorship, 
for which two of them were suspended and a third expelled 
from party membership.
The limitations of the Simalungun bloc were clearly in 
evidence during the selection by the DPRD-GR of a Regional 
Secretary (Sekretaris Daerah) in 1964. Many Simalungun Batak, 
within and without the DPRD-GR, took the position that such 
an important office, second only in responsibility to the 
Regional Head, ought to be given to a member of the indige­
nous ethnic group of the regency. Informal meetings, attended 
by some members of the bloc and by a number of civil servants 
and other interested individuals who were not members of the
19. The designation given to the group by non-Simalungun 
Batak. Simalungun Batak in the DPRD-GR deny that such 
a bloc exists.
20. See my Politics in Simalungun: A Study in Political
Integration, Ch. 9.
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DPRD-GR, were held to discuss the problem, and pressure 
was applied on the Regional Head.
In the final analysis, however, non-ethnic factors 
played the deciding role. The Regional Head, perhaps 
afraid of losing ParkindoTs support and concerned that an 
attempt to push a fellow Simalungun Batak might make him 
appear too suku-conscious21 provided only hesitant leader­
ship. Within the DPRD-GR, Simalungun Batak PNI members, 
under suspension because of their previous letter of sup­
port for the Regional Head, chose to adhere to the party 
line rather than support a Simalungun Batak candidate.
NUfs leaders insisted on a Moslem Simalungun Batak,
Partai Katholikfs DPRD-GR representative wanted the Secre­
tary-ship for himself, and even Parkindo1s Simalungun Batak 
leader (although no longer permitted by law to be a party 
member because of his civil service rank) was apparently 
wary of future reprisals from his party. When the final 
selection took place the candidate of the PNI, PKI and 
Parkindo, a North Tapanuli Batak, won a two-thirds majority. 
The nominee generally assumed to be the candidate of the 
Simalungun bloc won only two votes, both from non-party 
functional group representatives. Rather than vote for a 
non-Moslem, NU walked out of the meeting. On this impor­
tant issue kesatuan Simalungun was unattainable.
Conclusions
Between the Simalungun Batak community and the politi­
cal system of independent Indonesia there has evolved a 
unique pattern of relationships. Of the four major ethnic 
groups in the regency only the Simalungun Batak have failed 
to develop an affiliation with a national political party. 
Since the banning of KRSST most Simalungun Batak villagers 
have had no organizational link with the regency-level pol­
itical process. What representation and influence they 
have in Siantar is based largely on personal relationships 
between individual residents of Upper Simalungun and mem­
bers of the regency political elite, and on the need of 
the Regional Head and other urban politicians for community 
support. For the most part, however, the people of Upper 
Simalungun do not participate in regency politics, where
21. A few months previously the Karo Batak Regional Head 
of the East Sumatran town of Tebing Tinggi who engi­
neered the selection of a Karo Batak Regional Secretary, 
was attacked by the PKI, PNI and several other parties, 
and subsequently was "retooled."
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the political game is played by the elite in an organiza­
tional vacuum.
Since the selection of a Simalungun Batak Regional 
Head in I960, the urban party leaders have enjoyed a con­
siderable increase in their influence in regency politics.
This influence has been based not on the support of the vil­
lages , which they have been unable or unwilling to organize 
effectively, but on the patronage of the Regional Head and 
his provincial and national allies. In the years 1960-1961!- 
cooperation among the members of the elite, cutting across 
marga and regional divisions and even to some extent re­
ligious and traditional-revolutionary cleavages, was possible 
on many issues. Confronted by a choice between suku and 
party, however, cooperation could not be maintained. Sima­
lungun unity, rooted as much in the personal ambitions of 
the politicians as in their desire to advance the interests 
of the suku, has proved to be a fragile flower.
The transition from traditional to colonial to post­
independence politics has been a difficult one for the Sima­
lungun Batak community. Small in numbers, internally diverse, 
hemmed in by other, larger ethnic groups, the suku and its 
leadership have been unable to play a significant role in the 
determination of their own destiny. Their most critical 
weakness has been their inability to affiliate with a national 
political party, for it is only through some form of supra- 
local coalition, on a multi-ethnic basis, that the group 
can hope to enter the mainstream of Indonesian political 
life. The representation of some group interests through 
the provincial army hierarchy and through the army officer 
who serves as Regional Head has provided a partial substitute 
for affiliation with a national party, particularly in recent 
years when the role of the military in authoritative decision­
making has been much greater than that of the parties. This 
kind of representation does not, however, provide a stable 
basis for representation in the political process. army 
officers, by the nature of their profession, are normally 
far removed from their cultural origins and respond more 
readily to stimuli coming from within the military than to 
demands emanating from their ethnic group. Their relative 
strength as members of particular internal army factions is 
derived not from any links with those outside the army whose 
interests they may from time to time articulate, but rather 
from factors internal to the army itself (e. g., the 1956-57 
coup, which ended in the strengthening of Karo Batak and 
secondarily Simalungun Batak, at the expense of North Tapanuli 
Batak). To depend entirely on army officers for the repre­
sentation of one’s interests means to be at the mercy of the 
vagaries of internal army politics.
Suku Simalungun is caught in a dilemma. More than any
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other group in the regency, the Simalungun Batak villagers of 
Upper Simalungun have been cut off from the political processes 
of independent Indonesia, The only kind of organization which 
has been able to win their support has been based on ethnic 
exclusiveness, a principle which is unacceptable to the domin­
ant political elite and dysfunctional for the achievement of 
the groupfs individual and collective goals. Conversely, those 
few Simalungun Batak politicians, most of them residents of 
Siantar, who associated themselves with national political par­
ties have been unable to build support among their potential 
constituencies in the villages. The Simalungun people and their 
leadership have thus not been able to develop the kind of polit­
ical organization, rooted in the villages and linked with the 
national political system, which might enable them over time to 
achieve effective representation and a measure of integration 
into the national political process. Moreover, with continued 
army dominance of Indonesian political life, the prospects for 
the development of effective and influential political organi­
zation do not seem bright.
Appendix I
The relationship between the traditional kingdoms (keradjaan) 
and the present sub-districts (ketjamatan) is readily apparent 
from a comparison of Map 2 above with the map of the same size 
depicting the traditional kingdoms in The General Agricultural 
Condition of Simeloengoen, Gunseibu— Kezaibu, Pematang Siantar, 
2602 (194-2). It should also be noted, however, that the Dutch 
Regularized" kingdom boundaries as you find them in The General 
Agricultural map and on pp. 1-3 of that same source. The dis­
tricts were in the Dutch time the center of colonial administra­
tive services, and they were just taken over by the Republic and 
renamed ketjamatan, with the exception of district Pane proper, 
which seemed unwieldy to the bupati and was split into Pane and 
Dolok Pardamaian, and also the exceptions of keradjaan Purba and 
Silimakuta, which were small and not subdivided into districts, 
so themselves became ketjamatan. The seven kingdoms and the 
corresponding present-day ketjamatan are as follows: 1. Siantar
(Sidamanik, Bandar, Siantar); 2. Tanah Djawa (Parapat, Balata, 
Dolok Panribuan, Bosar Maligas, Tanah Djawa); 3. Pane (Dolok 
Batunanggar, Pane, Dolok Pardamaian); 4. Raja (Raja Kahean,
Raja); 5. Dolok Silau (Silau Kahean, Dolok Silau); 6. Purba 
(Purba); 7. Silimakuta (Silimakuta).

